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INTHE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
FRED WILSTEAD,
Plaintiff,

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, THE INDEPENDENT
COAL & COKE CO., AND CONTINENTAL CASUALTY CO.

Case No.
10318

Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The plaintiff is an employee of defendant, The Independent Coal & Coke Co., a self insured employer. The
plaintiff filed an application for compensation on April 7,
1964, with the defendant, The Industrial Commission of
Utah, alleging that on or about Feb. 10, 1960, he sustained
injury arising out of or in the course of employment, while
employed at Castle Gate, Utah, by defendant, Independent
Coal & Coke Co., said injury being received in the following manner: "Twisted back while lifting a rock." The parts
of the body injured and subsequent results are "Back was
injured." Has been operated on twice and has had a back
fusion. Injured left work June 28, 1960, and disability continued to present time, but injured returned to work July
13, 1964. The defendant, The Independent Coal & Coke Co.,
a self insurer, paid wages to and including June 27, 1960.
The accident was not disputed; and defendant, The lnde-
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penden.t C~a.l & Coke ~o., paid compensation for temporary
tot~l d1sab1hty to and mcluding Jan. 11, 1963. The compens~t10~ .payments were $44.50 per week. No temporary total
d1sab1hty compensation payments were paid from Jan. n
1963, up to July 13, 1964, a period of over 74 weeks, and
such payments if paid would have amounted to over $3,
293.00.
The plaintiff appeared before a Medical Advisory
Board, and they determined as of Jan. 23, 1964, his permanent partial disability at 20% loss of bodily function.
The plaintiff claims that the award of Dec. 9, 1964.
by the Industrial Commission of Utah should be modified
so as to award him temporary total disability for the period
from Jan. 11, 1963, to July 13, 1964, or, for the period from
Jan. 11, 1963 to the date of his determination of his permanent partial disability on January 23, 1964, for approximately 54 weeks, or a total temporary disaibility of $2,403.00.
DISPOSITION BY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
As per their order of Dec., 9, 1964, the Industrial
Commission of Utah awarded him permanent partial disability of $1,700.00, or 40 weeks at $44.50 per week, based
on 20% loss of bodily function, but denied him any total
temporary compensation from Jan. 11, 1963, either to Jan.
29, 1964, or to time of reemployment, July 13, 1964.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Modification of the award to allow him total temporary
disability for the period from Jan. 11, 1963, until he wais
aJble to return to work, July 13, 1964, or total temporary
disability for the period from Jan. 11, 1964, until he appeared before the Medical Advisory Board, and his perma·
nent partial diability was then determined at 20%, on Jan.
23, 1964.
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ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission of Utah based their denial
of temporary total disability for the periods above s·et forth,
or either of them, on the fact that as follows:
"Because both Dr. Beck and Dr. Powell released
applicant as of Jan. 11, 1963, applicant ts entitled
to temporary total compensation from Dec. 28,
1962 to and including Jan. 11, 1963, the date applicant was released for light work"
though the record shows that his employer, The Independent Coal & Coke Co. refused to give him any work until he
was restored where to he could do a full days work as in
the past, and provided no light work for him, as recommended by the Drs. Beck and Dr. Powell, and the record
further shows that Dr. Chester B. Powell as late as June
20, 1963, wrote as follows:
Dr. 0. W. Phelps, 42 South Main St., Helper, Utah.
Re: Fred Wilstead:
Mr. Wilstead was rechecked at your referral June
14, 1963. Thank you for forwarding Dr. Linstrom's
note which is herewith r·eturned.
At this time, the first occasion on which I had
seen Fred since January, he reported the following course:
Attempted to return to work in January but unable on account of pain. January to May: Became
gradually stronger but pain persisted across the
middle of the back and down the back of the legs.
The pain comes and goes. Questi?ning discloses
that pain is significantly greatei:: m !~ft le~ and
that coughing aggravates the pam chiefly m the
back.
And upon reexamination of the plaintiff: F~ed Wilstead, Dr. Powell in his findings upon reexammation J~ly
20, 1963, which are on file in the records of the Industrial
Commission of Utah, found as follows:
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"Reexamination:. Exar:1ina~ion of the back discloses
a loss of l<;>rdos1s, ~mld tightness of paravertebral
mu~cles with localrzed tenderness in the lumbar
reg10n generally. Percussion produces pain with·
out radiating characteristks.
Lower extermities-the sciatic stretch sign is bilaterally negative for sciatic irritability although
straight leg elevation from either side reproduces
back discomfort.
There is subjective hypassthesia demonstrable in
both legs, without very clear margins.
Right Leg: Lateral calf and foot (probably S !root)
Left Leg: Anterior and lateral aspect of the calf,
dorsum of foot (probably L 4+ L 57)
Impression: Residual low back and possibly radicular pain without reliable localizing signs and
symptoms for involved roots.
Comment: Would concur with Doctor Lindstrom
that probably there is a r&dicular componant here
and that there is some psychegenic overlay. Would
not feel, however, that the evidence with respect
to specific nerveroots is sufficiently clear to justify reoperation and rhizetomy-how could one be
sure which sensery roots were specifically involv·
ed? How many sensory roots should be sectioned?
One would naturally desire. If such a procedure
were carried out, to give the patient worthwhile
relief without adding to his neurologic impariment.
Would very much concur with Dr. Lindstrom that
cordetomy would be inappropriate, certainly at
this time because of the additional deficit it would
impose.
My strong recommendation at this time is ~o ~en;·
porize longer in the hope that the. future. will md1·
cate diminishing pain and an mcreasmg range
of activity.
I doubt very much that the patient will ever be
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able to resume heavy work but do feel that he will
probably be rehabilitable in a sedentary job.
~~le I su.spect that Mr. Wilstead's ultimate disa~1hty ratm~ on t~e basis of maximal recovery

will be relatively high for a back and disc order.
I would suggest that deferring such a rating three
to six months will result in a lower rating.
1f for any reason it is necessary to obtain a rating

at this time I would suggest referring Mr. Wilstead to an Industrial Commi·ssion panel.

I wish there were something more effective to offer in a very difficult problem of this sort. With
best regards,
Sincerely yours,
Chester B. Powell, M.D."
cc:
N. R. Beck, M.D.
William A. Dorsey, M.D.,
Mutual of Omaha.
From this reexamination of June 14, 1963, 5 months
later than the Industrial Commission claimed that Drs.
Beck and Powell had released the plaintiff, it does not seem
that the Drs. Beck and Dr. Powell did so find that the
plaintiff could be released for light work, for as Dr. Powell
stated:
"My strong recommendation at this time is to temporize longer in the hope that the future will indicate diminishing pain and an increasing range of
activity"
and the fact appears that the plaintiff should of as matter
of right been awarded total temporary permanent disability
as of Jan. 25, 1964, the time plaintiff's permanent partial
disability was fixed at 20% loss of bodily function, as compared to an amputation of the1 arm at the shoulder, which
entitled him to compensation for 40 weeks at $44.50 per
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week, beginning Jan. 25, 1964, payments to be made every
four weeks, if his right to recover total temporary perma·
nent disability is limited from Jan. 11, 1963, to the date
of the 20% rating of loss of bodily function, to-wit: Jan.
25, 1964, because then his condition became fixed, though
of course it's the plaintiff's contention that the loss of bod·
ily function should not deprive him of permanent total tern·
porary disability from Jan. 11, 1963, until he returned to
work on July 13, 1964.
As Otto A. Wisely, Chairman, Industrial Commission
of Utah, in a letter dated Nov. 9, 1954, to T. Van Campen,
Kaiser Steel Corporation, Sunnyside, Utah; stated:
"We have received a number of complaints that
you have refused to pay compensation to employ·
ees who have been released for light duty. Accord·
ing to the complaints, you have not supplied the
light duty and have terminated compensation.
"It has always been the rule of the Commission and
I am sure it is the law that the employer must supply the light work or continue payment of compen·
sation until the man's condition has become fixed,
and he is given a permanent partial disability rat·
ing or returns to regular duty.

Evidently, the Industrial Commission on Dec. 9, 1964,
in their ruling on the question of temporary total disability,
as set forth in the beginning of the argument herein, failed
to follow their previous policy, because it held that the
plaintiff was only entitled to permanent total temporary
disability up to Jan. 11, 1963, and not to the date of (1)
either Jan. 25, 1964, when the rating for loss of bodily func·
tion was fixed or (2) when the plaintiff resumed work,
July 13 1964 holding that since the Doctors released him
for light work as of Jan. 11, 1963, though the employer di~
not supply light work, and would not accept him back until
he could perform at his regular duty a full days work for
a full days pay, that he was not entitled to temporary total
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permanent disability either for the period of Jan. 13, 1963,
until Jan. 25, 1964, in the amount of approximately $2,403.00, or for the period of Jan. 13, 1963, until July 13, 1964,
in the amount of approximately $3,203.50.
As stated in the "Law of Workmen's compensation,
Vols 1 & 2, Larsen, Sec. 57-61, it is stated, Sec. 57-61, Workmen's Compensation, Voll:
"Unemployment without total medical disability"
"Inability to get work traceable to compensable injury may be as effective as establishing disability
as inability to perform work"
"Even without total medical disability the two essentials are present: wage loss, and causation of
the wage loss by work connected injury:
(Lonido v. Lewis, 75 A. 2nd 108)
"Employee remains disabled by inability to do same
work, not light work.
(Helen v. New Amsterdam,
128 S., 2nd, 269.
and as stated in Vol. 1, 57-30, Vol. 1, Larsen, Workmens'
Compensation:
"Compensation is awarded not for the injury as
such but rather for an impairment of earning capacity caused by the injury"
(Zegales Case, 325 Mass. 128, 80 NE 264)
And, as stated in Meyler v. A. G. Ins. Co., 122 South
2nd, 100, having been refused light employment duties by
employer, the claiment was held totally disabled.
And, in McKenzi v. Campbell Mfg. Co., 354 SW 2nd,
440, it was held:
"Temporary total disability is payable ~rom. dat~. of
injury to date when permanent partial d1sab1hty
could be determined."
And, in this case, as hereinabove stated, Dr. Powell
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the examining Physician found that even after as the I .
dustrial Commission claimed, he had been released for Jig~\
work, that the healing period of the plaintiff was not over
and that he was still unable to perform the same work h~
had been performing, and that because of such injuries he
could not perform other work; and also, that he was a coal
miner, doing heavy work, and he could not qualify for this
work, until his injuries healed.
Here, the plaintiff is not seeking total permanent dis·
ability compensation; he is seeking temporary total disabil·
ity for the period which he could not resume work; he has
went back to working at his old employment for Indepen·
dent Coal & Coke Co., but see~s payment for compensa·
tion either on the basis up and to the time his rating became fixed as aforesaid, or up until the time he resumed
work, which here was July 13, 1964.
Also, while the plaintiff was on Jan. 25, 1964, awarded
permanent partial disability for 20% loss of bodily function, or 40 weeks of $44.50, or $1,780.00, and while he has
received total temporary disaibility up to Jan 11, 1963, the
amounts he now seeks for temporary disability does not
come within the limitation of Secs 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and 35·
1-67, as the amounts by these statutes is limited to $14,757.00, $8,759.00, and $15,415.00, as amended by the Legis·
lature in 1961, and under Utah Apex Mining Co. v. Indus·
trial Commission of Utah, 209 P. 2nd, 571, and Peerle9l
Sales Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 107 U. 419,
154 P. 2nd, 644, and in fact the amounts received in actual·
ity, if you find in his favor, is way below the amounts set
up as limitations to recovery in such cases.
In checking the cases, and particularly in Utah, they
deal with permanent total incapacity or disability, and n~t
temporary total incapacity or disability. The plain.tiff is
seeking no award for total permanent disability, he is o.nly
seeking compensation for the extent of his healing penod,
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which he claims did not end until July 13, 1964, or which by
bw may have ended Jan. 25, 1964, when his rating of loss
of bodily function was determined by the Medical Board
on Jan. 29, 1964, as advised by the Industrial Commission
as shown by the records and files in this case of the In~
dustrial Commission of Utah, which have been filed with
the Supreme Court.
In the case of Spring Canyon Coal Co. vs. Industrial
Commission of Utah, 74 U. 103, 277 P. 208, and in case of
Ctah Fuel Co. vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 76 U.
141, 145, 287 P. 931, these cases deal with claims for total
permanent disability, where the workman seeks pay for
injuries. and because of these injuries, cannot return to
work at hiR work before he was injured. Here, the plaintiff
resumed his work, and wants temporary disability compensation not until Jan. 13, 1963, as the defendant, and
self insurer, Independent Coal & Coke Co. want to be the
limit of their liability for temporary disability, but either
temporary disability until Jan. 25, 1964, when a 20% c:lisabilit:v rating was given him, or until July 13, 1964, when
he resumed work.

The only applicability that the decisions of this Court
would have relative to this case is whether during the
period of healing the plaintiff was bound to obtain outside
work. Dr. Powell stated the plaintiff tried to resume work
Jan. 13, 1963, but could not make it, and his (Dr. Powell's)
reexamination on June 14, 1964, confirmed that, and then
put an additional 3 to 6 months before rating could be
made, or the same would be too high.
As stated in Olsen v. Triplett, 255 Ky. 724, 75 S. W.
(2n) 366, the Court stated:
"That is a well settled rule that "total disability"
does not mean absolute helplessness or entire physical diability; that it means loss of ~ru:ning p<>W~r
as a workman in consequence of the InJUry, mabII·
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!ty t_o. perform such work as may be obtainable or
mab1hty to secure work to do"
And as set forth in Texas Employer's Insurance Asso·
ciation v. King, 346 SW2d, 380:
"'!'otal incapacity" as used in this charge does not
imply an absolute disability to perform any kind
of labor, but a person disqualified for performing
the _usual tasks of a workman to such extent that
~e is _una?le to proccure and retain employment
is ordmarlly regarded as being totally incapacited
or totally disabled"
And, in Relph Lightner, Petitioner and Respondent, vs.
Samuel F. Cohn, Respondent and Apellant, 184 A. 2d 878,
on page 881 thereof, the Court said:
"An employee who is so injured that he can perform
no services other than those which are so limited
in quality, dependability, or quantity that a reas·
onable stable market for them does not exist, may
well be classified as totally disabled.
Here, the plaintiff is a coal miner, and that is his
only occupation. Dr. Powell certified that the only possible
work he could do for some time was sedentary, and the
employer, defendant herein, stated they did not want him
until he could return and do a day's full work, and they had
no light work for him.
CONCLUSION
Under the facts and law in this case, we believe that
the award of the Industrial Commission rendered Dec. 9,
1964, should be modified to award to the plaintiff addition·
al temporary disability, either from Jan. 13, 1963, to date
of rating of loss of bodily function, Jan. 29, 1964, or fr~m
Jan. 13, 1963, until July 13, 1964, the time when the plain·
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tiff resumed work again at the mine in Kenilworth or
Castle Gate, Utah, operated by the employer and defendant
herein, Independent Coal & Coke Co, and to keep in force
the award for partial permanent disability, to-wit: 20% of
Joss of bodily function; both awards being permissible under
the statute and both justified in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANK B. HANSON,
Attorney for Plaintiff.

